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While investigating the historical perspective of joint  forest management (JFM) programme, this paper 
observes that the resistance movement of forest communities in western Midnapore division in West 
Bengal, which acted as key precursor to JFM programme in India through a June 1990 Ministry of 
Environment and Forest (MOEF) circular based upon, to a large extent, the successful experience of 
joint management in Arabari hills, under this division, have been mobilized by the poor forest 
communities from long past for their community right on their forest resources in connection with the 
immediate survival needs. The study of existing four-forest protection committees (FPCs) of this area 
also confirms that this immediate survival needs generating mainly from non-timber forest products’ 
(NTFPs) income of FPC members are the key element for the sustainability of JFM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The author would like to thank Mr.Debal Roy, Divisional Forest Officer, west Midnapore division and 
Mr.Abhijit Basu Roy Choudhury, Chief Conservator of Forest Research, Department of Forest, Govt. of 
West Bengal, for providing data of this paper. Special thanks to Mr.Nihar Ranjan Chakroborty, DFO 
(Statistics) and Mr.Gopal De, Assistant Statistician, Department of Forest, Govt.of West Bengal, for helpful 
comments. 
 
 1 
               In the context of Indian forestry, several strands have gone to make up the present emphasis on 
community involvement in forest protection. Joint Forest Management (JFM) can be seen to emerge as the 
latest in the history of policy changes, as well as one more in a series of attempt to create a new relationship 
between the state and the community in terms of forest management .The old custodian forest management 
system developed were rendered ineffective in 1950’s and 1960’s due to various reasons. The major reason 
being traditional emphasis on production of commercial wood and disregard for local need. Against this old 
custodian forest management system the local communities in different parts of India have mobilized 
repeatedly from long past to protect their resources from manipulation from outside groups. The emergence 
of new community forest management system in west Midnapore division in West Bengal, like some other 
parts of rural India, is grounded historically in tribal and peasant resistance movements.  
               The paper is organized as follows: section I presents the historical perspective of the study, section 
II provides a short review of the relevant literature, section III covers the data set and findings, and 
conclusions are contained in section IV.  
 
I. Historical Perspective 
              In the pre-colonial period, western Midnapore was covered by dense Jungle tracts (dense forest). 
While patches of forests, particularly along river plains, had been cleared for agriculture, much of the area 
was wild and remote. Western Midnapore, primarily populated by Santal, Bhumij, and Mahato tribals, with 
some low-caste Hindus, included the police stations (Thana) of Garbetta, Binpur, Gopiballavpur, Salboni, 
Sildha and Jhargram. Prior to the colonial era, while this area was nominally under Mughal control due to 
the inaccessibility of the area, little attempt was made to extract revenues or exert political authority. 
Forest-dwelling communities of this area could resist incursions into the area. Their superior knowledge of 
the jungle and their hunting skills made them an effective guerrilla force. Some Bhumij communities 
gained the reputation as CHAURS (robbers), from their aggressive raids into the plains. Many local rajas 
(kings) and zamindars (land-lords) preferred to leave them alone and not attempt to extract taxes from 
them, rather than to enter conflicts with jungle people (Poffenberger, 1995). 
Many tribal communities that maintained forest oriented self-sufficient economics were best able 
to obstruct outside political domination. They alternatively protected their political autonomy and forest 
resources. The Santal and Bhumij tribal communities of forest inhabitants practiced shifting (swidden) 
cultivation as well as hunting and gathering forest products1. Much of their diet was provided from wild 
fruits, roots, herbs and the nutritious flowers and fruit pulp of  the Mahua (Madhuca) tree, making them less 
dependent on agriculture. Tribal villagers were also actively engaged in trade in firewood, silk, resin, deer 
and buffalo, horns, wax, honey, bark fabrics, lac, medicine and charcoal2.  
             Along with the survival needs of the forest communities, cultural values of them also retained 
health, fertility and prosperity of the forest. During the pre-colonial period, and up to the present, the belief 
systems of the forest communities of this area were strongly grounded in the worship of nature. Religious 
festivals are tied to both the agricultural cycle and the flowering and fruiting of the forest trees. The Santal 
New Year, for example, begins with the blossoming of the sal (shorea robusta) tree in March. This links in 
tribal beliefs3 helped the regeneration of natural forest.  
              In 1760, the district of Midnapore was transferred to the East India Company by Mir Qasim, 
making it one of the first districts in India to be brought under British rule4. During the late eighteenth 
century the British sent military expeditions into this area in an attempt to extend their authority and extract 
land revenues. The forest chieftains and tribal communities resisted, ambushing British forces and 
harassing them whenever possible. Local zamindars also resisted the imposition of colonial authority, 
refusing to pay their taxes, organizing their paik militias to resist, and falling into arrears on their taxes. In 
1798, widespread violent resistance disrupted revenue collection activities in the Midnapore area, forcing 
the Company to restore lands to hereditary chiefs that had been put up for sale for failure to pay taxes. 
 2 
Through superior force, however, the British did gradually succeed in extending their control in the 
area through the nineteenth century. As this process continued, the British empowered a new class of 
zamindars to control and tax local forest communities, encouraging them to open forest land for cultivation. 
In order to meet their tax obligation, zamindars were anxious to bring in tribal and peasant cultivators to 
clear forest and convert it to agricultural land. The tribal communities of this area resisted the imposition of 
the taxing and conversion system through a series of armed revolts. The first, referred to as the Chuar 
Rebellions,   lasted   from  1767   to  18005.  Tribal   guerrillas   were  so  effective  that   ‘even   as   late  as  
1800, after nearly forty years of British occupation, a collector reported that two thirds of Midnapore 
consisted of jungle, the greater part of which was inaccessible’6. Yet gradually the Company succeeded in 
strengthening its control, despite subsequent revolts by forest people, such as the Naik Revolt (1806-16). 
Under the Permanent Settlement Act by 1866, 1369 zamindari estates had been established in Midnapore, 
and given the absolute ownership of agricultural and forest lands as long as they paid government revenues. 
The process of forest clearing for agricultural land conversion had sweeping ecological 
implications, especially for river systems and soil conditions. Removal of forest cover allowed torrential 
monsoon rains to wash away the shallow top soils, leaving an exposed laterite hard pan that made farming 
virtually impossible in many areas. Traditional forest based industries like tusar silk, indigo and endi 
declined dramatically, as did the population density of this area as the forest was cleared. 
The pressure on the forest grew further by the 1860s as the growing railway system demanded 
immense quantities of sal logs to provide sleepers for rail bed. Commercial demand for timber accelerated 
forest cutting, and raised the value of forestlands. Timber merchants rushed in, even before the rail lines 
opened and began leasing or purchasing large tracts from the Midnapore Zamindary Company and other 
zamindars. 
In early 1855, six to seven thousand Santal tribals from, Birbhum, Bankura, Chotonagpur and 
Hazribagh began meeting for organizing resistance in response to their growing marginalization. On July 
16, 1855 some ten thousand tribals, under the messianic leadership of four Santal brothers stood their 
ground firmly and fought with bows and a kind of battle-axe in a battle near Pirpaiti7. The revolt collapsed 
eventually after half their members were reportedly killed. Despite their defeat the HUL Rebellion (as it is 
known among the Santal) profoundly influenced the ideological development of many Santal 
communities8, and lives on in the songs and oral traditions of the tribal people of this area. Throughout the 
later part of the nineteenth and first  half  of  the  twentieth century,  many  forest communities on this  area                       
 
became increasingly indebted to money lenders and tax collectors, causing widespread mortgaging and loss 
of their agricultural lands. Though the alienation of private lands was an important element in the 
impoverishment of tribal and low-caste communities, so too was the loss of cash and kind income from 
forest-based activities as the forests were cleared.  
The forest policy of post-colonial India continued on the colonial path of commercialization and 
reductionism, and with it continued people’s resistance to a denial of their basic needs, both through 
alienation of rights and through ecological degradation (Shiva, 1999). Despite the populist government in 
West Bengal after independence the old custodian system of commercial forestry, which disregarded local 
need also prevailed in western Midnapore. Throughout 1969 and 1970, some forest communities in this 
area were discontented with the Forest Department and its policies of providing elites and contractors with 
low-cost resource exploitation leases. Forests were logged of timber trees and bamboo and villagers lost the 
raw materials they required for their subsistence and commercial needs. The Dom tribals in particularly 
were upset by the high prices and fuel wood scarcity experienced by potters, blacksmiths, and other caste 
groups also increased antagonism towards the forest department and those who acted as contractors for 
them. 
              While successful examples of joint forest management were beginning to emerge in Arabari Hill in 
Midnapore district during the early 1970s, throughout the decade they remained isolated cases with little 
effect on routine forest management within the state. Recognizing the success of Arabari and a few other 
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villagers where management agreements with forest communities were being made, some senior forest 
officers like Dr. Ajit Kr. Benerjee, began to encourage field staff to pursue similar negotiations in wider 
areas throughout the southwestern part of the state. By formulating agreements that responded to the 
economic needs of forest communities, new incentives were created among villagers, which resulted in the 
emergence of   effective  controls  on  forest  exploitation. The  emergence  of  Chingra  Forest    Protection  
Committee, Chandana Forest Protection Committee, Harinakuri Forest Protection Committee are the 
examples of decentralized nature of forest protection group formation in Midnapore district. This early 
experience demonstrated that opening communications with forest communities could effectively reduce 
conflicts between the forest department and forest user groups. Forest officers were able to identify terms 
for effective management partnerships through discussions. In some communities village men formed 
volunteer patrols. People who were found cutting green wood or grazing animals were warned by village 
volunteers. Repeat offenders from the participating villages were fined, and outsiders were turned over to 
forestry field staff.  
The experience of some forest protection committees (FPCs) in this area illustrates the way in 
which village leaders like Mahadev Munda Singh of Chingra FPC, Lokhun Sahu of Chandna FPC and Joti 
Naik of Harinakuri FPC were able to work with field staff and other neighbouring communities to identity 
forest areas for protection and reach agreements, while turning away outsider users. It appears that the 
ability of local communities to take the lead in defining management territories was a key to the success of 
the programme. Although field staff helped facilitate this process by encouraging group meetings and 
authorizing community protection activities, frequently successful FPCs took the initiative in organizing 
themselves and establishing operational controls over forest access. Most confrontations came into effect 
during the first and second year of protection after which restriction and right of the protection committees 
were generally recognized by outsiders. 
Despite its early success, these early achievements were limited to small forest tracts of this area. 
The JFM in this area, however, was largely effective among most of the forest communities neighbouring 
the forest when West Bengal Government Orders were issued on 12th July, 1989 to formalize the FPC 
wherein the duties and responsibilities of the FPC members, usufructury, and other benefits to which they 
would  be  entitled  had  been  laid  down. The departmental  appeal to tribal communities to  protect  forest  
resources and its willingness to empower them apparently coincided with a growing desire among these 
communities to take environmental action. It was easier for communities to mobilize because the West 
Bengal programme did not require complex registration and budgetary allocations processes for 
communities to take action, but rather presented communities with a straightforward opportunity (protect 
the local forest and enjoy the benefits). As each community began protection activities, it influenced the 
behavior of neighbouring villages. Without necessary waiting for the forest department to take action, 
villagers were forced to negotiate and discuss management issues and needs with one another 
(Poffenberger, 1995). It is this community based ‘chain reaction’ or catalytic effect that is apparently a 
driving force behind the rapid emergence of localized access controls on state forest lands in southwest 
Bengal9. As per the latest State Forest Report published from Directorate of Forest, Govt. of West Bengal 
on December 2001, the total number of FPC in west Midnapore division was 542, the highest in number 
among all divisions in West Bengal. Thus the historical events outlined earlier in this discourse suggest that 
the communities in this area have mobilized repeatedly over long past to protect their resource rights from 
manipulation by outside groups. This study indicates that the emergence of new wider community forest 
management systems with a straightforward opportunity is grounded historically in tribal and forest 
communities resistance movements. In many parts of rural India, pockets of disempowered people have 
organized repeatedly to struggle for their survival as their resource base is increasingly captured by local 
elites, money lenders, tax collectors, and the state. In the past, each time the movement was crushed or 
collapsed, after some time it would reemerge. The people of western Midnapore in West Bengal represent a 
classical case. 
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 II. Review of studies 
            While empirical evidence across the world now confirms that community-based regimes are a 
viable option for the management of local common property resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996;  Berkes, 
 1989; Bromley, 1992; Correa, 1999;Lama and Marlene, 2002; Martin, 1992; McCay and Acheson, 1987; 
Naik, 1995; Saxena and Sarni, 1999; Singh, 1994 & 2001 etc.), the theoretical literature has developed an 
understanding of the mechanism which make these regime work.  The early research was pessimistic about 
the possibilities of group management, arguing that individuals would not face the full costs of their 
resource use under such regimes, and would have an incentive to over-exploit the resources.  This was the 
‘free-rider’ problem and the only way to solve this problem, according to their suggestion, was to create 
private property rights in the resource, or to regulate resource use by coercion through the state. This early 
theoretical tradition was inconsistent with the empirical evidence on group management regimes, and it was 
subsequently pointed out that the free-rider problem was a characteristic of the ‘unregulated commons’ or 
‘open access’. This was distinct from ‘common property’, a regime in which a clearly defined group co-
operated to manage a resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975).  It is no longer theoretically disputed 
that individuals can coordinate their actions and participate in collective regimes.         
        As better management of common property resources, such as forests, is considered vital for poverty 
alleviation, sustainable development with equity, ecological stability and preserving bio-diversity, there is a 
constant search for alternative approaches necessitated by the fact that the usual options of state or market 
mechanism are not advocated due to their inherent inadequacies. There is evidence to suggest that 
privatization of such common property, resources would enhance inequity of denying access to 
underprivileged classes of the community (Karnath, 1996).  But the survival of community needs of poor 
communities need to be recognized on a priority-based as pillars for strengthening their community 
participation (Mukherjee 1995).  Some authors produced general lists of conditions, which facilitate 
successful community based resource management (McKean, 1992; Wade, 1998; Baland and Platteaee, 
1996; Ostrom, 1990). Eleven factors are commonly identified in this literature as creating conditions which 
are  more  conducive to  local-level  management10.  But expectations of  immediate  returns  via wages and 
incomes from sale of old plantation and local consumption need to fill the requirements of fuelwood, 
fodder, minor forest produce and small timbers seemed the most important factors motivating massive local 
peoples, participation for protection and development of forests (Mukherjee, 1995; Naik, 1997; Saxena and 
Sarni 1999). The present process and basis of developing VFPCs/FPCs will need considerable 
strengthening if these have to be developed into robust and confident village institutions. The first 
important step in this direction is of ensuring that FPC members have clear entitlement to all types of forest 
produces from redefined JFM areas for meeting their bonafide requirements, with no removal of produce 
from the area unless it is surplus to local consumption needs. Moreover, the present policy of selecting the 
most degraded land for planting would have to be modified in favour of greater emphasis on regeneration 
and less on planting (Saxena and Sarni, 1999; p.213).  
                   But long-term gains hardly matter to people who are facing major problems of livelihood-food 
security. In depressed areas with higher level of poverty day-to-day existence comes top most on their 
agenda. The most urgent community need under JFM at Arjuni in Midnapore district, West Bengal is that 
of alternative means of livelihood during lean season with agriculture being the mainstay in peak season. 
The Arjuni experience in JFM shows that unless survival needs of food and livelihood are met, 
participation of natural resources management would always remain threatened (Mukherjee 1995; p. 3132). 
This experience goes a long way to show that survival needs are of prime importance and can easily 
destabilize community rights and benefits to resource management. Any JFM which does not recognize the 
significance of creating strategies for  sustaining  livelihood -food security - at the local level has  a 
doubtful  future  (ibid, p.3132). The findings of Naik (1997), based  in two case studies in  Gujrat state, can 
also help identify the factors critical in making the JFM successful and if there are controllable, such as 
 5 
market development and share of the local people  in  forest  produce,  necessary  steps  may   be  taken  to  
suitably change the factors in order to enhance the chances of success of  JFM.The present JFM needs to be                           
remodeled in terms of livelihood benefits which are immediate and less commercial (Mukherjee, 1995; 
p.3132). To this end, the forest policy of Govt. of India, 1998, recognized the need to fulfill the 
requirements of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and small timber of rural and tribal people, and 
emphasized the need to create massive people’s movement for protection and development of forest.  
     But concerning to the benefit-sharing arrangement between states and forest communities and the 
management of forest polices differ between states within the country. Orissa’s NTFP policies are among 
the most regressive in the country, guided by the principle that all forests and forest produces are state 
property; the NTFPs gatherers access to income from NTFPs are severely restricted due to existing policies. 
The Vana Samrakshan Samiti (VSS) gatherers get only wages for collecting the products. Thus even in 
jointly managed forest lands, the people, who are supposedly co-managers, are treated as mere hired 
labourers whose earnings are based on the minimum wage rate and not treated to the value of the products 
(Rao, 2001; p.261). In JFM, and also in the recent NTFP policy in Orissa, no steps have been taken to 
address the real problem of NTFP’s gatherers. The issues affecting the livelihoods of forest dependent poor 
women and men remain unaddressed, and any talk about community participation in management of forests 
and community rights remain meaningless (ibid, p.262). 
      The field context in which JFM is implemented brings together two principal players: the village 
community and the forest bureaucracy. Forest bureaucracy, in many cases, enforces rather than abdicates its 
power influencing adversely the relationship between forest communities and forest department. Benefit-
sharing arrangement in many states have also been specified in advance, without asking villagers whether 
they, in fact, want to harvest their timber, and how they would like the proceeds to be distributed. In most 
states, the committees are simply registered with the forest department. Only in five states (Gujrat, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Arunachal Pradesh and Karnataka) do the VPCs have a legally independent existence as co-
operatives registered under the Co-operative Society Act at least  formally (Jeffery and Sundar, 1999; p.45). 
In most cases the forest department also reserves the right to dissolve committees if they perform 
unsatisfactorily, or at least deny them the shares expected (Poffenberger and Singh, 1996; p.71, Jeffery and 
Sunder, 1999; p.45). As happened in the Panchmahals in Gujrat, parallel processes exist, refusing to 
register existing committees, specially if the forests they have been protecting have now turned from 
degraded into good forests (Agarwal and Saigal, 1996; p.7); or attempting to latch onto existing committees 
while simultaneously denying the legitimacy of rules they have been framed earlier and which do not fit 
into state resolutions (Sundar et al., 1996). Moreover, planners, policy makers and forest bureaucracy, in 
many cases, fails to develop appropriate strategies to successfully involve the poor (including women) who 
depend much more on the forest as they have little access to alternative source of biomass in community 
forestry. It has been well documented that community-based projects and programmes (specially in India 
and Nepal) ignore women and the poor (Agarwal, 1997; Hildyard et al., 1998; Hobley, 1996; Joekes et al., 
1996; Locke, 1999; Lama and Buchy, 2002; Sarin, 1998). Gender, class and castes are often overlooked by 
policy makers. Policy makers do not have understanding of individual relations that have constructed 
through gender, class and caste. Men and women form the poorer sections of the society, especially of the 
lower caste, have been excluded or prevented from participating in community forestry programme 
(Hobley, 1990; Lame and Buchy, 2002). Community forestry in Nepal fails to deliver its promise and 
instead disempowers those already marginalized. On the other hand, the local elite, rich families, upper 
caste group and leaders dominate decision-making process and as a result, get more benefit. This will in the 
long run alienate subaltern groups from mainstream development, hence threatening sustainable 
management of forest resources.  
         Although some researchers (e.g. Agarwal, 1986) have questioned the belief that foraging and 
fuelwood collection by the rural poor is primarily responsible for the shortages, the findings of these studies 
are ignored by  development  practitioners. It is commercial  demand that  have more frequently  resulted in 
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large-scale forest destruction (Shiva, 1999; Poffenberger 1995, 1996b; Correa, 1999). Earlier, inspite of 
govt. regulation, people would use the forests for firewood, manure and NTFPs. With the introduction of 
JFMP, people agree not to use (or to use specified areas) of the forest for these purposes, thereby restricting 
their use of the forest (Correa, 1999). It has been proved that community-based forest protection activities 
resulted in the rapid regeneration of degraded natural forests and confirmed the best prospects for 
sustainable forestry. Natural regrowth led to substantial increase in biomass productivity and enhanced 
availability of a range of important minor forest products. The capacity of degraded natural forests to 
rapidly regenerate and produce fodder, fuel, fibres and other valuable materials appears to have been 
instrumental in sustaining community protection activities (Poffenberger et al., 1995,1996b; Correa, 1999).  
 
III. Data set and findings 
                    The study is based on secondary data relating to the study entitled  “Role of NTFP in 
sustenance of JFM a case-study”, carried out by the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) west Midnapore 
division under the office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Govt. of West Bengal in 2001. The 
study was conducted in four FPCs of Nayagram block, in Paschim Midnapore district. The enter block is 
very well forested with forest covering about 48 per cent of the total geographical area. As per last census, 
Nayagram block has a total population of 106490 of which 18.33 per cent is scheduled cast and 40.45 per 
cent is scheduled tribe. Sabar constitute one of the dominant ethnic groups. The main economic activity of 
the population is agriculture, the income from forest sources being the second most important source. 
Almost entire forest was cut down during late `70s and early `80s of the last century mainly due 
to mass illicit felling by the contractors for the commercial needs. Since then, the forest resuscitated 
following the adaptation of joint forest management principles. The predominate species of the forest is sal 
with associates like mohua (madhuca indica), bahera (terminalia balerica), piasal (pterocarpus  marsupium),  
asan (terminalia tomentosa), karam (adina cordifolia), pial (buchanania lanzan) etc. Most of the tree cops 
are of coppice origin. The study has conducted in following four FPCs:  
 
Ambisole FPC - This forest protection committee is located in the Nayagram beat of Nayagram Range. 
The committee was registered in the year 1991, it’s registration number being 392/WM/FPC/224/NG-42. 
Total forest area under the forest protection committee is 130 hectares. There are 41 members in this FPC 
of which 40 belong to scheduled tribe and one to general caste. There are 23 Lodha members in this FPC. 
All the 40 scheduled tribe members of this FPC are landless. 
 
Bansiasole FPC - This forest protection committee is also located in the Nayagram beat of Nayagram 
Range. The committee was registered in the year 1990, it’s registration number being 
330/WM/FPC/45/NG-17. Total forest area protected by this FPC is 102 hectares. There are 60 members in 
this FPC, of which 34 belong to scheduled tribe and the rest 28 to general cast. There are 18 Lodha 
members in this FPC. All the 34 scheduled tribe member of this FPC is landless. 
 
Kasia FPC - This forest protection committee is located in Chandabilla beat of Chandabilla Range. The 
committee was registered in the year 1991, it’s registration number being 378/CB/WM. Total forest area 
protected by this FPC is 215.89 hectares. There are 100 members in this FPC, of which 24 belong to 
scheduled tribe and the rest to general caste. There are 11 Lodha members in this FPC. Fourty-one families 
are landless.        
      
Kadokata FPC - This forest protection committee is also located in Chandabilla beat of Chandabilla 
Range. The committee was registered in the year 1995, it’s registration number being 409/CB/WM. Total 
forest area protected in this FPC is 343.27 hectares. There are 24 members in this FPC. All of them are 
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tribal. The forest protected by this FPCs shows typical characteristic of this area. Tree species in the forest 
were enumerated by laying out sample plots. 
 
                This empirical study might help us know whether the economic returns from forest - the share of 
net revenue from final harvesting of timber, income in the form of wages from forestry activities and 
income from NTFP in the forest - are significant for FPC member for the sustainability of JFM. But data in 
some cases are non-classified and non-tabulated. Despite these limitations, we have attempted to study their 
findings in simple proportions, averages and in some tabular forms for this paper. A mathematical model is 
also framed in the light of our empirical results (represents in the appendix).       
                 As may be seen in table 1, the per capita annual money incomes from the share of revenue from 
timber are dissimilar across four FPCs studied. Since felling intervals are not same for all FPCs studied, 
area of felling coupe is not uniform and per capita forest of FPC members across the committees are 
dissimilar; also per capita notional income of a member per year is not equal. It is important to mention that 
each FPC, according to JFM agreement, becomes eligible to get a share of 25 per cent of total revenue 
earned from final harvesting of timber products. It is also observed that although per capita annual money 
income of a member of Ambisole and Kadokata FPCs is higher than that of total average. Out of total 
forestry income of FPCs, the share of revenue of final harvest of timber is 1.48 per cent in Ambisole FPC, 
0.36 per cent in Bansiasole FPC, 0.22 per cent in Kasia FPC and 1 .37 per cent in Kadokata FPC. As the 
share of revenue from timber is very small source of income for all FPC members and this income is 
received by the FPC members at some irregular annual intervals, this income, usually, does not meet up 
their immediate survival needs. It is important to mention that although the success of Arabari experience 
in JFM in Midnapore district, West Bengal is well known, however, ironically, in the same district, JFM of 
Arjuni mouza which started from 1991, failed to deliver results after the middle of 1994 as the members of 
FPC were only granted to have 25 per cent share of timber, without any other share of the forest resources 
which was insufficient to meet up the immediate survival needs of poor FPC members. It caused for large 
illicit felling, mainly, by the poor forest committees due  to  meeting up their immediate seasonal livelihood  
and food insecurity, which plagued the area and led to conditions of semi-starvation amongst the poor 
people.  
In order to meet their immediate survival need, the poor FPC members are exclusively engaged 
as labour in forestry operations carried out in their respective jurisdiction. All such forestry operations, such 
as raising nursery, planting, tending, harvesting, entry point activities are labour intensive and serve as 
small scale of their income, particularly in the lean season (Table 2). Income from this source per member 
per year is computed by adding wage component of total amount spent over 5 years (1996-97 to 2000-01) 
in a particular FPC and dividing it, first, with strength of FPC members and then with number of years (five 
years in this case). This source of income, too, is variable across FPCs and depends on the scope of forestry 
operation in a particular committee area. Income as wages from forestry works constitute 4.80 per cent in 
Ambisole FPC, 5.67 per cent in Bansiasole FPC, 2.34 per cent in Kasia FPC and 10.98 per cent in 
Kadokata FPC out of their total income from the forestry sector. Although this source is small, it is one of 
their sources of survival during lean season (June to September). 
In addition to the maintenance of regular consumption needs of the local FPC members, NTFP 
is the main source of money income for all FPC members under our study (Tables 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d). Some 
common characteristics may be discerned in this regard. First, the money income generated from the share 
of revenue from timber and income as wage from forestry works are insignificant in relation to NTFPs for 
all FPCs studied. The contribution of NTFPs’ income of Ambisole, Bansiasole, Kasia and Kadokata FPCs 
are 93.72 per cent, 93.98 per cent, 97.44 per cent and 87.65 per cent respectively out of the total money 
income (from all sources) of the respective FPCs.  Secondly, sal leaves (shorea robusta) are the main 
source of money income of NTFPs for all FPC members. More than 35 per cent of total NTFPs’ incomes 
for all FPC members come from the sale of sal leaves to the local market. The period of availability of sal 
leaves is the highest (10 months in a year) of all NTFPs. The money income received from other NTFPs are 
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 different for different FPCs. Thirdly, out of 36 types of NTFPs, 10 types11 are common to all FPCs 
studied. The contribution of these common NTFPs’ income of Ambisole, Bansiasole, Kasia and Kadokata 
FPCs works out to 62.58 per cent, 70.18 per cent, 62.20 per cent and 78.64 per cent respectively out of total 
NTFPs’ income of the respective FPCs. Fourthly, the period of availability for the same NTFP does not 
differ among FPC members. Moreover, the local rate (Rs. per unit) of the same NTFP does not differ 
among FPC members. The members of each FPC dispose of the same NTFP at a fixed price. The amount 
of output the members of the FPCs decides to sale seems to have no effect on the local market of the 
product. 
 This study, however suggests that the relative importance of NTFPs in forest-based economics 
is supreme. Consequently, it plays the major role in sustenance of joint forest management and to this end 
the FPC members are expected to optimize the production from timber to NTFPs (discussed in the 
appendix with a mathematical model). Although, the sample size (four FPCs) is too small to make a 
generalization, it may be said that in predominantly tribal FPCs with a good cover of sal forest, NTFPs 
provide the main source of forestry income. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The historical context in which JFM has emerged as the latest in a history of policy changes in 
India has been grounded since long past by the community resistance movement of local poor communities 
against the old custodian system of forest management. In many parts of India where forests are an essential 
component of the local livelihood support system, a community-based rights regime with build-in 
safeguard for access and the livelihood of forest dependent people have been grounded historically and that 
have provided a solution to problems of sustainable forest management as well as sustainable local 
livelihood maintaining bio-diversity, ecological balance and environmental stability. This study also 
suggests that the present   JFM  model needs to be  remodeled  in  terms of  livelihood  benefits of the  poor 
forest communities which are immediate and less commercial and in line with this, the new policy 
management of both degraded and non-degraded forests are to be re-oriented from timber production to 
optimizing the production of NTFPs for strengthing the livelihood of local communities as well as the 
sustainability of community forest management with environmental stability. Any JFM, which does not 
recognize significance of sustaining livelihood -food security - at the local level, have a doubtful future. 
 
APPENDIX 
MODEL : The solution to optimal resource exploitation problems of community forestry relating to the 
sustainability of JFM system may be studied by the form of present-value Hamiltonian function. This form 
assumes that simple replication of past decision with any other choice (there is none, in fact) to be made at 
some later date. Each decision imposes an externality on the future (Silberberg, 1990; p.14-15). The 
solutions to this problem are termed ‘open-loop control’. They represent once-and-for-all solutions to 
dynamic optimization problems, which are as if the firm decides in the initial period what to do for all 
future periods and stick to that plan. The following assumptions are taken in this regard.  
 
Firstly, the growth function of NTFPs is a continuous time-logistic function  
                           v  (t)=g (v (t), u (t), t)   
where v (t) is the stock and u (t) is the rate of harvest. The logistic growth function is widely used in 
empirical analysis (Hanley et al., 1997: chapter 10). The growth of NTFPs may continue for some years 
although ultimately the volume of NTFPs reaches at its peak and then declines as the NTFPs decay and 
eventually die. It has the characteristics that at low stock rate of growth is low, it peaks at a particular time 
and then declines towards zero. 
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                 Secondly, the total income (nominal and /or physical) of NTFPs is shared equally among the 
members of local forest communities involved in JFM program. Government does not take any share of 
income from NTFPs.  
Thirdly, the members of FPC in JFM sell the NTFPs in a competitive market at a fixed price 
(discussed in the text). pu is the net revenue function and u is the control variable.  
Finally, both harvesting and planting of non-timber trees are costless. 
JFM committee aims to maximize its profit subject to the stock over an infinite time interval. 
Mathematically the problem is  
                                 Maxu  ∫o
∝
 pu e-rt dt                                                                  (1) 
                    subject to    v  = g (v, u, t),     v (o) = vo                  
where u is the harvest rate at time t (NTFPs are usually harvested every year). v is the stock, pu is the net 
revenue function and g(.) is a logistic growth function. x (o) is the initial stock [Endpoint conditions vary. 
Typically the initial stock is fixed, although the final stock may not be (Silberberg, 1990; p 618)]. r is the 
discount rate. The variables v,u and λ all have time subscripts. The growth function, g (v, u, t) = av+bv2- u, 
a > 0; b < 0. 
           The necessary conditions can be represented by introducing Hamiltonian function, H (.) 
H (v, u, λ, t) = pue- rt  + λg (v, u, t) 
       
            This function is equal to the profit plus the change in the stock valued by its shadow price. The 
Hamiltonian allows a convenient representation of the necessary conditions which compromise the 
maximum priciple: first differentiation H(.) with respect to u and setting equal to zero. 
        δ H  =  pe- rt  + λ gu   = 0                                                                  (2) 
        δ u                                          
where the Hamiltonian is maximised with respect to u, and the costate condition is  
                              δ H  =  λ  = - λ gv                                                                            (3) 
                              δ u                                             
          The costate variable is not of direct interest, so (2) and (3) are used to eliminate it. In the same 
series of manipulations, the time variable is also eliminated so that results can be expressed independently 
of time.  
        First writing (2) explicitly for the logistic growth function  
                            pe- rt  - λ  = 0                                                                                 (4)  
and note that this implies that harvest continues until the marginal profit (here average profit) equal the 
marginal value of stock, λ. 
              Differentiating (4) with respect to time  
                            λ = -r pe- rt                                                                                    (5) 
              When the specific functional form (logistic growth function) is included, (3) can be written as  
                λ = - λ (a + 2bv)                                                                          (6)                         
               The procedure now is to eliminate the costate variable and define a steady-state solution. 
To this end, equate (5) with the (6) and eliminate λ using (4) to define a steady-state equilibrium 
                             r = a +2bv = gv                                                                           (7)   
where own rate of return on the stock (gv) is equal to the discount rate (r). 
               The term gv is of great importance: it indicates how the rate of stock growth changes with respect 
to the stock and it, therefore, represents the return on relating the marginal unit of stock. Thus gv is the own 
rate of return on the stock. 
               The system of differential equations is complete by the growth equation  
                         v  = g(u,v) = av + bv² - u                                                           (8) 
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                 This is the required result, it represents the problem as two autonomous differential equations (7) 
and (8) which are independent of time. Although there is no guarantee that these equations can be solved 
analytically, they allow us to assess the optimal harvest rate of NTFPs given initial conditions (v0, u0) and a 
steady-state solution which may be viewed as the comparative static solution to the dynamic problem where 
the stock and the harvest rate are constant and no incentives exist to adjust them, to the problem (The 
equilibrium solution in an imperfect market is identical to that of the competitive problem [7] ). 
                 The necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to (1) can be achieved by checking that 
second order derivative of the maximized Hamiltonian with respect to v is non-positive 
       δ
2
 H   = λ 2b 
        δv2 
      As λ ≥ 0; that is, shadow price of stock is non-negative and b<0, the condition for concavity is 
satisfied and a solution which satisfies the maximum principle conditions is both necessary and sufficient 
(Hanley et al., 1997; p.200). 
                  If we, however, relax the last assumption and introduce cost function (cost per unit harvesting is 
declining function of the stock), the problem becomes 
                              Maxu  ∫o
∝
 (pu - c(v)q)e-rt dt 
                  subject to v = g (v,u,t),        x(o) = xo                                 
  and the result after manipulation will be                                 
             g/v) =  c/ (v) g(v)    =  r              
                                      
              
( p - c (v))                                                                    (9)                            
From (9) the rate of return on holding the marginal unit of stock can be decomposed into two 
parts: the return from increased stock growth, g/(v) and the return from reduce cost. This implies that the 
optimum level of stock is less in the presence of costs than would be case for zero costs.  
 
Notes 
1. See Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas, p. 28.  
2. For detailed information, see L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetter: Bankura (Calcutta 1911),           
W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal: vol- III (London, 1876). 
3. The links in tribal belief between the health of the forest, fertility and prosperity are clear in the following 
lines from this Baha festival song.  
When the sal trees are in leaf, 
On the mountain, 
How lovely they look, 
Wealth in the house…. 
See W.G. Archer, The Hill of Flutes, Love and Poetry in Tribal India: A Portrait of  the Santals 
(London,1974), p.237, for and extensive discussion. 
4. See S.Dasgupta, Adivasi Policies in Midnapore  
5. The British adopted the Bengali term ‘chaur’ meaning an outlandish or wild person, to refer to the tribal and 
low-caste people of the area. 
6. For detailed information, see Duyker,Tribal Guerrillas, p. 35. 
7. See Dutta (Calcutta, 1940) the Santal Insurrection of 1855-1857, p. 26. 
8. For discussion, see Duyker,Tribal Guerrillas, p. 35. 
9. It is likely that similar community concerns over environmental degradation in other parts of India could 
provide effective support for joint management programmes if initiated by state forest departments. 
10.  The common factors are (i) perceived benefits from co-operating; (ii) clearly defined rights and boundaries 
for resources; (iii) knowledge about the state of the resources; (iv) small size of the user group; (v) low degree 
of heterogeneity of the user group; (vi) long-term, multi-layered interaction among the community; (vii) 
simple rules and adaptable management regimes; (viii) graduated sanctions as punishment; (ix) ease of 
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monitoring, and accountability; (x) conflict resolution mechanisms and the role of leadership; (xi) influences 
from the wider political economy. 
11.  The common NTFPs are sal leaves, pial fruit, mohua fruit, mohua flower, kurchi fruit, haritaki fruit, dudhi 
lata, kurkura mushroom, karan mushroom, ghora insect.   
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            Table 1: Income from the share of revenue from timber from 1995-96 to 2000-01  
Name of 
FPC 
No. of 
members 
Share of revenue for the entire FPC (Rs.) Income/ 
member/ 
year (Rs.) 
  1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01  
Ambisole 41 0 13373 0 79734 0 0 378 (1.48) 
Bansiasole 60 0 15338 0 0 0 11984 76 (0.36) 
Kasia 100 0 0 0 0 48084 0 80 (0.22) 
Kadokata 24 0 0 0 0 0 80985 562 (1.37) 
Total 225 0 28711 0 79734 48084 92969 185 (0.59) 
      Figures within brackets represent percentages in respect of income from timber out of total forestry income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Table 2: Income as wage from forestry-works from 1996-97 to 2000-01  
Name of FPC No. of members Amount spent in the FPC 
in this five years(Rs.) 
Income/member/year 
(Rs.) 
Ambisole 41 251629.33 1227.64 
(4.80) 
Bansiasole 60 355459.40 1184.86 
(5.67) 
Kasia 100 432531.18 865.06 
(2.34) 
Kadokata 24 539749.97 4497.91 
(10.98) 
Total 225 1579369.88 1403.88 
(4.53) 
Figures within brackets represent percentages in respect of income as wage from forestry 
work out of total forestry income. 
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          Table 3a: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs 
                         of Ambisole FPC. 
          
         NTFPs 
Period of 
collection 
Local rate (Rs.) Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 2000 nos. 8400 
 (35.04) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days  
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 1 kg 420 
 (1.75) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) 
30 days 
 (Apr - May) 
8 per 90 kg 720 
 (3.00) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 2.5 kg 900 
 (3.76) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days  (Mar 
- Apr) 
3 per kg 5 kg 450 
 (1.88) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days  
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 1 kg 660  
(2.76) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 3 kg 450  
(1.88) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 400 nos. 480 
 (2.01) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 4 kg 1200  
(5.00) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 1 kg 600  
(2.50) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.3 kg 1170 
 (4.88) 
Rahara (Soymida 
febrifuja) fruit 
20 days  (May 
- June) 
6 per hundred 300 nos. 360  
(1.50) 
Sidha (Lagerstroemia 
parviflora) fruit 
15 days 3 per kg 2 kg 90  
(0.38) 
Anantamul 
(Hemidesmus 
indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 2 kg 600  
(2.50) 
Satamul (Asperagus 
racemosus) 
15 days 6 per kg 2 kg 180  
(0.75) 
Chun alu ( Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 2 kg 1440  
(6.01) 
Kalmegh 15 days 7 per kg 6 kg 630 
 (2.63) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720 
 (3.00 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 2.5 kg 2700  
(11.26) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.5 kg 1800 
 (7.51) 
Total    23970* 
 (100) 
         Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
         *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Ambisole FPC members works out to 93.72 out of their forestry 
income. 
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         Table 3b: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs 
                         of Bansiasole FPC. 
          
         NTFPs 
Period of 
collection 
Local rate (Rs.) Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 2000 nos. 8400 
 (42.67) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days  
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 0.5 kg 210 
 (1.07) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) 
30 days 
 (Apr - May) 
8 per 30 kg 240 
 (1.22) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 0.5 kg 180 
 (0.91) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days  (Mar 
- Apr) 
3 per kg 10 kg 900 
 (4.57) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days  
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 1 kg 660  
(3.35) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 2 kg 300  
(1.53) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 500 nos. 600 
 (3.05) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 3.5 kg 1050  
(5.34) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 2 kg 1200  
(6.09) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.25 kg 975 
 (4.95) 
Ban karala (Urea 
lobata) 
30 days   25 per kg 0.1 kg 75  
(0.38) 
Anantamul 
(Hemidesmus 
indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 1 kg 300  
(1.52) 
Satamul (Asperagus 
racemosus) 
15 days 6 per kg 3 kg 270  
(1.37) 
Chun alu ( Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720  
(3.66) 
Kalmegh 15 days 7 per kg 5 kg 525 
 (2.67) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 0.5 kg 360 
 (1.83) 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 1.5 kg 1620  
(8.23) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.25 kg 900 
 (4.57) 
Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days 
May 
20 per kg 10 kg 200 
(1.02) 
Total    19685* 
 (100) 
         Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
         *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Bansiasole FPC members works out to 93.98 out of their forestry 
income. 
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        Table 3c: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs  of Kasia FPC. 
       
         NTFPs 
Period of 
collection 
Local rate (Rs.) Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 3500 nos. 14700 
(40.89) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days 
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 2.5 kg 1050 
(2.92) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) fruit 
30 days (Apr- 
May) 
8 per kg 120 kg 960 
(2.67) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per 3 kg 1080 
(3.00) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days 
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 2 kg 1320 
(3.67) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 2 kg 300 
(0.83) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 150 nos. 180 
(0.50) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 2 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 2 kg 1200 
(3.34) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.25 kg 975 
(2.71) 
Bhurru (Gardenia 
gummifera) fruit 
20 days 4 per kg 5kg 400 
(1.11) 
Atari (Combretum 
decundrum) fruit 
15 days 2 per kg 20 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Anantamul (Hemi-
desmus indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 2 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) gum 
120 days 10 per kg 1 kg 1200 
(3.34) 
Chun alu (Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 1.5 kg 1080 
(3.05) 
Bahera gum 120 days 10 per kg 2 kg 2400 
(6.67) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720 
(2.07) 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 2 kg 2160 
(6.01) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.25 kg 900 
(2.50) 
Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days (May) 20 per kg 20 kg 400 
(1.11) 
Pog mushroom 60 days (July-
Aug) 
8 per kg 1.5 kg 720 
(2.00) 
Jara kalai (Glycine 
hispida) 
75 days (June-
Aug) 
30 per kg 80 kg 2400 
(6.67) 
Total    35945* 
(100) 
          Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
        *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Kasia FPC members works out to 97.44 out of their forestry income. 
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          Table 3d: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs 
                           of Kadokata FPC. 
                           
         NTFPs 
Period of 
collection 
Local rate (Rs.) Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 5000 nos. 21000 
(58.48) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days (Apr- 
May) 
20 per kg 5 kg 2100 
(5.85) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) fruit 
30 days (Apr- 
May) 
8 per kg 40 kg 320 
(0.89) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 2 kg 720 
(2.01) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days 
 (Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 0.5 kg 330 
(0.92) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 3.5 kg 525 
(1.46) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 50 nos. 60 
(0.17) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 5 kg 1500 
(4.18) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 1.5 kg 900 
(2.51) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.2 kg 780 
(2.17) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days (Mar-
Apr) 
3 per kg 3.5kg 315 
(0.88) 
Atari (Combretum 
decundrum) jhanti 
60 days 10 per basket 0.5 pon. 3000 
(8.35) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) fruit 
30 days 2 per kg 10 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) gum 
120 days 10 per kg 0.5 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Bahera gum 120 days 10 per kg 1.5 kg 1800 
(5.01) 
Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days (May) 20 per kg 20 kg 400 
(1.11) 
Pog mushroom 60 days (July-
Aug) 
8 per kg 2 kg 960 
(2.67) 
Total    35910* 
(100) 
         Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
        *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Kadokata FPC members works out to 87.65 out of their forestry income. 
